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It is difficult to escape the notion of “common sense” in today’s 
political discourse. It is, generally speaking, considered to be a 
positive quality, and it is something which not only attaches itself to 
individuals, but also to whole peoples. It can inhere as an aspect of 
someone you know, a friend or member of the family, but it can 
also be used to describe the collective character of a nation. As an 
English man, of a certain age and generation, I am well used to 
characterizations of my nationality expressed in terms of ‘good 
common sense’ and that all important ‘stiff-upper lip’. 
Images of the dutiful and commonsensical English shopkeeper 
organizing the books or the stoical and down-to-earth housewife 
managing the finances of the home have been employed by the 
media and politicians ad-infinitum in order to lend succour to certain 
political and ideological projects. Think, for example, of Margaret 
Thatcher’s neoliberal mandate to radically reshape the UK economy 
being framed in terms of a dutiful homemaker trying to balance 
household bills. As I write, there is an eerie silence in the street 
outside my window; the Coronavirus crisis has sent people 
scurrying for cover, and now the majority of us are confined to our 
homes for the majority of time. A depressing, and at times 
oppressive situation; but, our media assures us, we will come 
through this, and why? Because “our national character is all about 
common sense and buckling down”.1  
But despite its ubiquity, pinning the notion down is no easy task. 
As Peter Thomas points out, “common sense” has different linea-
ges in different “linguistic registers and cultural systems” – there is, 
for example, “no clear correspondence between the Italian and 
English terms”.2 For the English, it might be said to imply some-
thing more than someone who is simply practical, someone who is 
good with their hands – good at fixing things etc. And yet, at the 
 
1 John Humphrys, “The Crisis : Should the Government Be Listening More to Us?”, YouGov, 
April 17 2020:  
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/04/17/crisis-should-government-
be-listening-more-us. 
2 Peter D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, Chicago, Haymarket Books 2010, p. 16, note 61. 





same time it also suggests something less than a coherent and con-
scious set of ethics; a person, one feels, can be good or bad, and yet 
still have a great deal of common sense. Do women have more of it 
than men? Is it something innate or is it something you can learn? 
Having had my head in the clouds for the last few decades, having 
concocted one hair-brained scheme after the next, is it possible that 
– under the right influence or tuition – I might attain a better level 
of common sense? These questions are not easy to answer. There is 
an ephemeral quality to the concept; as soon as you seize upon it, it 
slips away like so much sand through the fingers. 
And yet most of us do feel we have a handle on what common 
sense is. Even if we can’t explain it, even if we can’t express it as a 
precisely delineated logical definition. It is something which 
resembles Justice Porter Stewart’s definition of pornography; I 
might not be able to intelligibly define it, argued the venerable 
judge, “but I know it when I see it”. With this, the judge himself 
was perhaps engaged in an act of common-sensical thinking. The 
problem, however, is at once apparent; the definition of 
pornography is often an elastic one – there are places in the world, 
for instance, where a woman exposing her leg in a market place 
would be considered the very height of pornographic obscenity. 
The concept itself is exposed to the changes and pressures wrought 
by social circumstance and historical time. And something similar is 
true in the case of “common sense”. 
In her Common Sense: A Political History, Sophia Rosenfeld finds 
that the concept first emerged as “a technical term of Aristotelian 
science”.3 In Aristotle’s work, De Anima, the great philosopher of 
antiquity would argue that the “common-sense” is in fact 
something akin to a sixth-sense; specifically, it is the means by 
which the other five senses are able to interact. The eyesight allows 
us to perceive the purple colour of that particular flower, while the 
nose might allow us to take in the sweetness of its fragrance; but 
another sense entirely is required in order to distinguish between 
the ‘purple colour’ and the ‘sweet fragrance’ – to be able to 
experience these sensations as discrete and separate phenomenon 
while at the same time to allow us to recognize that the purple 
colour and the pleasant smell are both properties of the same 
 
3 Sophia Rosenfeld, Common Sense: A Political History , Cambridge (MA). Harvard University 
Press 2011, p. 4. 





object, i.e. the flower. Not only humans, but also animals must have 
some means, some faculty, “some one thing”4 by which sensations 
might be both distinguished and compared. Common sense then, 
for Aristotle, is in some way the unifying pre-condition for 
consciousness itself. 
Of course, this is very far from the way we understand it today. 
In Roman times, however, the concept becomes something more 
recognizable to us. Whereas Aristotle had treated common sense as 
a technical facet which allows for the physical possibility of 
consciousness, the Romans tend to treat it more in the manner of a 
metaphysical set of beliefs which had a clear ethical component. It 
was used to describe those beliefs which were in some way formed 
in the crucible of collective, social life. According to Toni Vogel 
Carey, the Roman concept of sensus communis is to be understood 
through philosophers and statesman such as Cicero who saw it ‘as 
the shared, often unspoken values and beliefs of a community.’5 
This was important because sensus communis was not something 
consciously articulated, developed by the most sophisticated 
philosophers in terms of a rational and systematic set of ethical 
precepts; rather it was something unconscious, something 
‘unspoken’, formed in and through the practical activities of the 
mass of people as they went about creating the foundations for 
Roman society – building the viaducts, bridges and colosseums, 
fighting in the wars, praying in the temples, haggling in the markets 
and rioting in the cities; the political and cultural processes which 
were taking place all the time and from which arose the values and 
sensibilities of the Roman collective. Common sense, therefore, was 
not something you could glean from the most refined of teachers 
but only something you might discover in the midst and furore of 
vast swathes of people as they came together in the broader com-
munity. C. S. Lewis, for instance, wrote of the Roman scholar and 
educator Quintilian that he felt “it is better to send a boy to school 
than to have a private tutor for him at home; for if he is kept away 
from the herd (“congressus”) how will he ever learn that sensus 
which we call communis?”6 
 
4 Aristotle, De Anima, Column 427a: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.html. 
5
 Toni Vogel Carey, ‘The Life & Death of Common Sense’, Philosophy Now, 2015: 
https://philosophynow.org/issues/110/The_Life_and_Death_of_Common_Sense. 
6 C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words, London, Cambridge University Press 1960, p. 146. 





So it is clear that the Roman concept of common sense involves 
certain sensibilities which were in some way pre-rational and intui-
tive, and also had a strong democratic impetus, i.e. they arose in and 
through the life of the broader community. At the same time we 
have to remember that this was not just any community; Quintillian 
was waxing lyrical at the time when Rome had entered its most 
glorious phase of expansion and empire, the famous pax Romana. 
When Roman patrician philosophers talk about the shared ethical 
sensibilities of the Roman collective, they are also talking about a 
culture whose boundaries have been delineated in precise oppos-
ition to the regions, kingdoms, tribes, villages and polities which 
had been subsumed as part and parcel of the Roman imperial 
project. Consequently the community standard which Roman 
common sense embodies often takes on a rather superior and elitist 
tinge; Scott Philip Segrest, for instance, argues that for Cicero com-
mon sense implied “elegant manners”,7 while C.S Lewis suggests 
that, for Horace, “the man who talks to you when you obviously 
don’t want to talk lacks communis sensus”.8 In other words, 
common sense, for the Romans, seems to have been a somewhat 
paradoxical thing; on the one hand, it was said to issue from the 
lives of the broader majority of people – but at the same time had a 
certain patrician inflection – i.e. it was bound up with notions of 
social superiority and upper-class etiquette; for the Romans, 
common sense might (loosely) be translated into what the British 
mean today when they talk about someone having “breeding”. 
In the modern era some of the same contradictions abide. At its 
outset, Descartes introduces a set of claims about common sense 
which are knotty and problematic, but highly intriguing. On the one 
hand, he talks about common sense as being the faculty which 
helped mediate between the body with the mind ; for this reason he 
located it as something at work in his ‘penal gland’, that infamous 
deus ex machina of Cartesian dualism. But over and above this almost 
Aristotelian conception, he also brought to the fore another type of 
common sense understanding which the philosopher labelled ‘bon 
sens’ or good sense. For Schaeffer, Cartesian “good sense” 
represents a return to elements in the Roman stoical tradition, it 
 
7 Scott Philip Segrest, America and the Political Philosophy of Common Sense, Columbia, University of 
Missouri Press 2010, p. 27. 
8 C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words, cit., p.146-7. 





was something which emanated from the masses, and it was tied to 
the ability to navigate life on a practical level – good sense was at 
the same time “practical judgment”.9 But such a conception stood 
as a potential anomaly within the Cartesian system itself; remember 
that, for Descartes, truth in its purest and most powerful form was 
conveyed by the “clear and distinct ideas” which existed as an a 
priori fact which had been imprinted on the human mind by an all-
powerful deity. A-priori universality formed the very foundation of 
Cartesian rationalism; but notions of a common sense which 
developed in and through the experience of the majority of people 
in the course of practical social life smacked of a certain empiricist 
dimension which Descartes’ philosophy implacably opposed. 
Future versions of ‘common sense’ evolved very much with this 
contradiction in mind. Descartes may have been one of the first of 
the modern era to evolve a conception of “common sense” which 
was tied to the practical life of the majority, but such a conception 
was very swiftly weaponized, very quickly trained on the philo-
sopher who had authored it. Francis Bacon had argued against 
metaphysical speculation, bringing to the fore the role of empirical 
science – the reading of physical reality from a series of experiment-
al steps. For him, therefore, common sense was a kind of counter-
part in ordinary life to what the Renaissance scientist was able to 
achieve in and through experimentation; i.e. the perceptions and 
inclinations of common sense were developed out of the actually 
existing empirical reality which people encounter in and through 
sense perception. Common sense did not rise to the level of the 
type of scientific induction which Bacon himself helped develop, 
that is true; but it nevertheless proceeded from the correct premises 
– i.e. the empirical reality itself and not the chimeras cast by the 
fleeting phantom-like operations of the ephemeral rationalist mind. 
And this contradiction assumed explicitly political dimensions 
too. Common sense increasingly became associated with a down-
to-earth type empiricism which could be opposed to an elevated 
and esoteric rationalism that had become the intellectual property 
of a superior and lofty elite. As F. L. van Holthoon would argue, 
references to common sense could be mobilized against the Anciens 
Régimes which were associated with more elitist philosophical 
 
9 John D. Schaeffer, Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism, Durham and 
London, Duke University Press 1990, p. 69. 





leanings – Queen Christina, for instance, had famously patronized 
Descartes and even invited him to the Swedish Court. Bishop 
Berkeley would go on to write how Enlightenment itself requires a 
“revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature 
and common sense”.10 Of course Berkeley’s statement is 
problematic – not least for the fact that his own brand of 
empiricism eventually yielded the most unadulterated and extreme 
form of idealism, but also because Cartesian universalism and the 
method of doubt – the scepticism which gave life to it – provided a 
powerful impetus to Enlightenment thought. 
But the overall point stands; a certain philosophical conception 
of common sense – which adopted the universalism of Enlighten-
ment thought while at the same time locating the source for that 
universalism not in the pristine and generic rationality of the 
individual ego but in the swell and practical life of the mass of the 
population – could become a philosophical conception with 
extremely radical dimensions. In jettisoning the “metaphysical 
baggage”, in providing a form of Enlightenment universalism 
which proceeded from empirical grounds, such a universalism 
could then be tied to the radical life and rebellious energies of the 
masses as a whole at the level of their day-to-day existence. And in 
an epoch where it was essential for the most revolutionary repress-
entatives of the bourgeoisie to be able to pull the masses into the 
revolt against the forms of aristocracy and kingship which 
buttressed the old order – the reconfiguration of common sense 
thinking according to a radical paradigm was one which allowed a 
broader social collective to assert its rights and hegemony against 
the tyranny of individual and arbitrary power. 
The apotheosis of this approach arrived with Tom Paine’s 
Common Sense. A pamphlet which was written at the outset of the 
American Revolution and War of Independence, it is often credited 
with helping the vacillating rebels move from a position of com-
promise and toward one of total rebellion and complete severance 
with the British Crown. For this reason, Common Sense is thought to 
have been a significant influence on the Declaration of Independ-
ence. In the pamphlet Paine combines Enlightenment universalism 
– ideas about the inherent equality of all men framed in terms of a 
 
10 George B. Berkeley, George Berkeley: Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, London and 
New York, Routledge 2016, p. 58. 





series of natural rights – with the kind of plain-speaking 
proselytizing which had come out of the radical traditions of lay-
preaching Protestantism (and his own religious background in 
Quakerism). The insidious and corrupting nature of kingship, and 
the yearning of the average citizen to the rights of liberty, property 
and the pursuit of happiness – the intellectual case for all of this is 
laid bare in and through “simple facts, plain arguments, and 
common sense”.11 
By framing his rhetoric in just such a way, Paine not only wanted 
to argue that the common sense thinking which arose from the 
average citizen in the course of his practical life had a radical 
component which was inherently anti-tyranny and tended toward 
the type of Enlightenment thought which worked to secure the 
legal rights and protections that pertained to just such a life. In 
fusing common sense thought with a radical set of Enlightenment 
political ideals, Paine was reaching out beyond a purely theoretical 
compass; he was simultaneously fusing the broader life of a layer of 
the masses with the explicit goals of a radical section of the 
American bourgeoisie and their struggle to free themselves from 
the dominion of the British crown. He was, to put it in the political 
idiom of the modern day, helping forge the basis for a mass 
movement. In the same vein, if the key to radical empowerment lay 
with a broader section of the population, then the King, by virtue 
of his isolation and privilege – his abstraction from the larger 
human realm – was by nature particularly ill-suited to realize a 
conception of the needs of society at large. Consequently, he, the 
King, was in no position to dictate how society should be run:  
 
There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of monarchy; 
it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him to 
act in cases where the highest judgment is required. The state of a king shuts 
him from the world, yet the business of a king requires him to know it 
thoroughly; wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally opposing and 
destroying each other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.12 
 
 
11 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, ‘Thoughts on the Present State of American Affairs’, US 
History.org: https://www.ushistory.org/paine/commonsense/sense4.htm  
12 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, ‘Of the Origin and Design of Government in General, with 
Concise Remarks on the English Constitution’, US History.org: 
https://www.ushistory.org/paine/commonsense/sense2.htm. 





Paine went on to give concrete examples of exactly how kingship 
had functioned in the past; to throw into relief the contrast between 
the realities of monarchy which were fused with conquest and 
dominion and the exhortations against tyranny which Paine was 
able to pick out (it must be said rather selectively) from the Bible, a 
book he seems to have known incredibly well. He relentlessly 
honed in on specific historical abuses by monarchs:  
 
no man in his senses can say that their claim under William the Conqueror 
is a very honourable one. A French bastard landing with an armed Banditti and 
establishing himself king of England against the consent of the natives, is in 
plain terms a very paltry rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in it.13 
 
Thus Paine was able to demystify the principle of monarchy, the 
irrationality of hereditary rule, the threat of tyranny and violence 
which, of necessity, underpins it – and in so doing Paine was able to 
strip George III of his divinely mandated aura; he was able to reveal 
him in plain and simple common sense terms as the “Royal Brute 
of Britain”, and thereby provide vital impetus to the movement 
which was developing against him.14 
However, the radicals of American Independence did not hold a 
monopoly on the concept of common sense. Indeed conservatives 
and reactionaries endeavoured to mobilise it for their own ends; 
James Chalmers, for instance, produced a riposte to Common Sense 
which was released just a year after Paine’s influential pamphlet. 
Chalmers titled his rebuke Plain Truth – and it was about occupying 
the same ground which Paine himself had staked out. Chalmers 
preceded from the same essential premise arguing that  
 
the rich and high born are not the monopolisers of wisdom and virtue; on 
the contrary, these qualities are more often to be found among the middling 
class in every country, who… in reality become better acquainted with the true 




 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, ‘Of Monarchy and Hereditary Succession’, US History.org: 
https://www.ushistory.org/paine/commonsense/sense3.htm. 
14 It is worth noting that Paine himself very much saw his tract in this way; he renounced his 
copyright so that Common Sense might be read as widely as possible, and indeed it was, from 
London to Vienna to Moscow. 
15
 James Chalmers, ‘Excerpts from Plain Truth’, Alpha History: 
https://alphahistory.com/americanrevolution/plain-truth-1776/ 





The broader majority here is delicately and diplomatically framed 
by the notion of ‘the middling class’ which no doubt excluded 
slaves, native Americans, women and the poorest, property-less 
whites – but the underlying logic is the same; i.e. those who are 
acquainted with the practical life of the economy on the ground, 
the merchants, farmers, fisherman, storeowners, carpenters and so 
on – these people are invested with a certain unconscious but 
practical wisdom which allows them to see through the mire of 
convoluted political rhetoric and to understand the issues of their 
day in essence. 
But Chalmers’ deployment of common sense thinking led to very 
different conclusions from those of Paine. For him, Paine’s 
conclusion that common sense demanded a violent schism, a break 
with the mother country was mere “quackery”. In actual fact, in his 
high-falutin and rather abstract attack on the notion of monarchy 
itself, Paine had lost sight of the immediate practical details which 
made a symbiotic connection between King and Country an 
absolutely vital one:  
 
There are many advantages of our connection with Britain; It will cause us 
to avoid the horrors and misfortune of war. Paine surely forgets that when we 
are independent, we cannot trade with Europe because the treaties are made 
under England’s name.16 
 
For Chalmers, common sense was all about compromise; indeed 
what made the British political apparatus so effective was that it 
provided an exercise in moderation in which all the component 
powers provide checks and balances against all others: “The British 
government is a beautiful system because it is ruled by the king, the 
upper class, and the people…our constitution is a compound of 
Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy”.17 Paine’s notion of com-
mon sense wasn’t actually common sensical at all – in threatening 
to do away with the King and the aristocracy and in absolutizing 
the ‘democratic’ element in politics thereby, his thinking had 
lurched into dangerous extremism; in the desire to explode 
“America’s” colony status, his thought had assumed an idealistic 
 









and abstract gloss which blurred and obscured the practical realities 
and everyday needs of the thirteen colonies themselves. 
The way in which the concept of “common sense” could be 
mobilized for different political causes became something of a 
mainstay in American politics; the same thing happened during the 
prosecution of the American Civil War. On the one hand, Abraham 
Lincoln, sitting by the fire in his log cabin, rocking back and forth 
in his old chair, ruminating over an open book on his lap – could 
be portrayed as the very epitome of home-spun, common sense 
wisdom; but at the same time the Confederacy could depict the 
anti-slavery position of the North as the endeavour of an industrial 
and cosmopolitan elite determined to impose its particular brand of 
modernity on a rural economy which had operated in a time-
honoured fashion for centuries according to the rhythms of the 
land and the passing of the seasons. In this particular ideological 
vision it was the denizens of the great slave estates (and I don’t 
mean the slaves) who became bastions of a stoical, common sense 
tradition, and it was no doubt a common sense proposition, as clear 
as day, to resist with everything they had the undermining and 
abnegation of a system of slavery on which their culture and way of 
life was premised. 
In these cases we have two conflicting claims to the truth of 
“common sense” which, ultimately, arise from very different and 
conflicting political and social interests. In these cases both sides 
purport to hold the “one true version” of what common sense 
thinking really is. But it was the great innovation of the brilliant 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, writing in the early part of the 
twentieth century, to recognise that “common sense” could be 
mobilized in multiple ways according to various social interests 
because it itself wasn’t “one thing”, that “there does not exist only 
one common sense”.18 In addition, for Gramsci, any common sense 
thought was inherently political – that is to say, it carried latent 
within it a certain conception of the world and the way in which it 
was organized. For Gramsci, thought provides a “totality of deter-
mined notions and concepts” which themselves arise, in the last 
analysis, from the “social groups” and “social elements” which have 
come to fruition at the level of historical being. The nexus of all 
 
18 Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, New York, International Publishers 1957, ed. 
and trans. L. Marks, p. 60; see also SPN p. 325: “there is not just one common sense”. 





thought is merely the totalized “system of beliefs, superstitions, 
opinions” – which mediate human beings with the social forms 
they encounter at the level of historical being it its entirety. How-
ever, a given individual doesn’t simply encounter “thought” as a 
complete and fully furnished totality. In the first instance, the 
individual experiences thought in a “disjointed and episodic way”, 
“seeing things and acting” in the world based on the fragmented 
conceptions which are inherited from those social forms or groups 
which mediate his or her particular existence. Such conceptions 
might, for instance, have their “origins in the parish and the ‘intel-
lectual activity’ of the local priest or aging patriarch whose wisdom 
is law, or in the little old woman who has inherited the lore of the 
witches or the minor intellectual soured by his own stupidity”.19 
Such “conceptions of the world” which come to constitute one’s 
self-consciousness, which provide a way of ‘seeing things’ and 
which becomes the premise of ‘acting’, of living one’s own life – for 
Gramsci, inhere in every self-consciousness from that of a five-
year-old child to that of an Aristotle. For this reason, “everyone is a 
philosopher”. But while, some “conceptions of the world” are im-
mediate and “mechanically imposed by the external environment … 
by one of the many social groups in which everyone is automatic-
ally involved from the moment of his entry into the conscious 
world” – over time it becomes possible to “work out consciously 
and critically one’s own conception of the world…be one’s own 
guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely from outside the 
moulding of one’s personality”. It becomes possible to supersede 
those fragmented and partial conceptions in order to see the world 
in terms of a totalized and “coherent unity”, the product of the 
“historical process to date” and in so doing take a conscious, 
rational and “active part in the creation of the history of the world”.20 
For Gramsci, common sense was a “conception of the world” 
which was still very much immediate and fragmented and, in the 
tradition of some of the Roman stoics and later thinkers such as 
Vico, he argued that common sense was in some way pre-rational. 
 
19 The phrases quoted in this paragraph are all from the same source in the Notebooks: Q11§12 
and its Note I, Quaderni del carcere (henceforward QdC), ed. V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi 1975 
pp. 1375-6; and, in English, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (henceforward 
SPN) London, Lawrence and Wishart and New York, International Publishers 1971, ed. and 
trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, and subsequent reprints, pp. 323-4. 
20 Again in this paragraph we cite the same source: QdC pp. 1375-6 and SPN pp. 323-4.  





In this way Gramsci is able to distinguish between common sense 
and philosophy. While a commonsensical conception of the world 
involves thoughts which arise from the “confused and dispersed 
characteristics of a generic thought of a certain epoch and a certain 
popular environment”21 involves those thoughts about the world 
which have been intellectualized consciously, which have been 
raised up in the light of a “reasoned” and systematic body of 
thought for the explicit ends of providing a coherent “political” 
description of the nature of reality – “in philosophy the 
characteristics of the individual elaboration of a thought are 
especially prominent”.22 But the nub lies in this; the philosophies 
which are raised to the level of self-conscious rationality in any 
particular epoch – the gains of such philosophies in their outlines, 
their fundaments, are often gradually disseminated such that they 
are absorbed implicitly and in some ways uncritically into the 
collective consciousness of the following age as commonsensical 
sensibilities and perspectives. 
Consider the example Gramsci provides – the popular phrase, 
that of ‘looking at things philosophically’. This, says Gramsci, 
contains a series of implicit assumptions and a powerful argument 
about the underlying rationality of the world and its development: it 
provides “the invitation to reflection, to explain to oneself that 
what is happening is at bottom rational and that it should be faced 
up to as such, concentrating on one’s own rational powers and not 
letting oneself be dragged along by instinctive and violent 
impulses”.23 In the common sense exhortation to “look at things 
philosophically” – is distilled elements of philosophy inherited from 
the past; the famous dictum of Hegel’s at once comes to mind: 
“what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational” – but “to 
look at things philosophically” also has the aroma of Roman 
Stoicism, the wise man who, according to Seneca, in some way 
escapes the necessities the objective world inflicts upon him, by 
rationally understanding them and thus willing their inevitability: 
“He escapes necessity because he wills what necessity is going to 
 
21
 Gramsci, QdC Q11§12, p. 1382. Here in English we quote the translation included in The 
Modern Prince and Other Writings, cit., p. 64, footnote; alternative translation in SPN, cit., p. 330, 
footnote. [Gramsci encloses the entire passage which contains these words between 
parentheses in this extended argument of his - editorial note] 
22 loc. cit. 
23 ibid., p. 62. 





force upon him.”24 In other words, the simple and gentle rejoinder 
to “look at things philosophically” which can be uttered almost 
unthinkingly as a way to encourage calmness and stepping back 
from a situation – is in some sense inconceivable had it not been 
for the flowing of philosophy in the time of the first century 
Roman Empire or the culmination of classical German philosophy 
in early-nineteenth century Heidelberg. 
“Common sense” for Gramsci involves an explicitly historical 
dimension; that is to say, it involves the accumulated debris of 
previous epochs of thought recycled into semi-conscious and 
intuitive feelings about the way in which reality is structured and 
how it behaves. Of course, if it is the case that the self-conscious 
modes and systems of “philosophy” which depict the spirit and 
realities of a particular epoch can be transformed into a more 
intuitive and pre-rational set of sensibilities in the next; then the 
obverse also applies. The common sense thought of any given age 
can itself be converted from a set of implicit, pre-rational 
assumptions to something which can attain the self-conscious 
clarity and critical awareness of philosophy Indeed the way in which 
this occurs falls under Gramsci’s notion of “translatability”, i.e. 
“[t]he philosophy of praxis ‘absorbs’ the subjective conception of 
reality (idealism) into the theory of the superstructures; it absorbs 
and explains it historically”.25  
For Gramsci, a class which successfully builds its hegemony – 
that is, its ability to ideologically justify its claims to power and 
ascendency – is a class whose intellectuals are able to locate those 
commonsensical propositions within the complex and 
contradictory morass of popular consciousness – and tease into 
rational self-awareness those propositions which best facilitate its 
own class ends, pulling sections of the masses who hold such 
propositions into alignment with its own struggle. More generally, 
the “organic intellectuals” as Gramsci terms them, are those who 
are called into being along with the development of a new social 
 
24 Seneca, ‘Asthma’, The Art of the Personal Essay, ed. Phillip Lopate, New York, Anchor Books 
1995, p. 9.  
25 Antonio Gramsci cited in Stephen Shapiro and Neil Lazarus, Translatability, Combined 
Unevenness, and World Literature in Antonio Gramsci, “Mediations” – Journal of the Marxist Literary 
Group Volume 32, No. 1 Fall 2018: https://mediationsjournal.org/articles/gramsci-world-
literature#endref_94. (QdC Q10II§6II, p. 1244; in English Further Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, ed. and trans. D. Boothman, London, Lawrence and Wishart, and Minneapolis, 
Minnesota University Press 1995, p. 306.)  





class and are able to give it “homogeneity and an awareness of its 
own function not only in the economic but also in the social and 
philosophical fields”;26 on this basis, the organic intellectuals aspire 
to mobilize and advance the interests of said class. 
Different classes, therefore, mediate different ‘common sense’ 
conceptions as part of their historical development, and for this 
reason, organic intellectuals endeavour to actualize and mobilize 
different strands of common sense for often opposing class 
interests. It is true that the phrase ‘look at things philosophically’ 
contains the germs of a radical conception of reality which in some 
way intuits the rational necessity behind historical development 
(albeit at the level of the individual destiny), but at the same time 
the same formulation also contains the seed of a certain passivity – 
a lulling and reactionary mandate to bow before the blows you 
receive, to accept the status quo and the powers-that-be, to submit 
to injustice meekly and gently with the knowledge that no other 
world is possible. For Gramsci there were many different versions 
of common sense, precisely because they were ideological 
fragments generated by the living movement of classes with 
opposing and sometimes violently clashing social interests. A class 
which aspires to political and economic power or a class which 
seeks to maintain it must, according to Gramsci, not simply exert 
itself through economic and political coercion but propagate its 
own values and norms such that other elements and social layers 
experience these as immutable and unchanging elements in the 
nature of reality itself. Gramsci describes this process as 
“hegemonic”, and class struggle more broadly as “a struggle of 
political ‘hegemonies’ and of opposing directions”.27 Part of 
achieving ‘hegemony’ means allowing the values which enshrine the 
power of a particular class to appear to the majority of the 
population as ‘commonsensical propositions’ which most people 
take for granted. For example, in the epoch which is dominated by 
a financial bourgeoisie and a philosophy of economic individualism 
it might well be a commonsensical proposition not to stop for 
strangers on the road because they will probably end up robbing 
you, simply for the ‘fact’ that human beings are inherently selfish 
and self-interested. 
 
26 QdC Q12§1, p. 1513; in English SPN, cit., p. 5. 
27 QdC, Q11§12, p. 1385; in English SPN, p.333. 





So the formation of a type of new type of ‘common sense’ which 
operates to normalize certain implicit justifications for the 
dominance of a particular ruling class or, in the same vein, the 
claims of a particular class aspiring to power – is a key part of 
establishing hegemony The ruling class has, if you like, its own 
form of common sense to draw upon, just as the oppressed and the 
exploited have theirs – “every social stratum has its own common 
sense”28 and these are manifested in the broader “struggle of 
‘political hegemonies’”. 
But while different strands of common sense do reflect and 
mediate different class interests, I don’t think it is accurate to say 
that the ruling class has its own form of common sense in the way 
that Gramsci believes. To elaborate. Part of the power of common 
sense thinking – identified from the Roman Stoics onwards is that 
it develops as part and parcel of the “crowd”, the “herd”, the 
“mass” – it is incubated in the life-forces of the broader popula-
tion.29 In the modern world, just as in ancient Rome, there is a stark 
division between the direct producers who create and recreate the 
immediate physical means by which all live, and the intellectual 
wing of society whose freedom from such direct forms of pro-
duction allows them to study, to specialize, to philosophize as part 
and parcel of a professional paid project, to form the think tanks 
which so often support so much of the ruling class policy, to 
become the professional TV personalities who appear presenting 
programmes on nature and art, to spend years in the universities 
and laboratories developing the scientific know-how which will 
eventually be applied in order to better develop the technology 
which the direct producers mobilize as part of their labour process.  
As Marx describes it,30 there develops a schism, an “antithesis 
between mental and physical labor” whereby those who are 
responsible for direct production are often reduced to the level of 
automatons, persons who carry out physical, repetitive labour 
 
28 QdC, Q1§65 p. 76 (in English PN Vol. 1, p. 173), cited in Kate Crehan, Gramsci’s Common 
Sense: Inequality and Its Narratives, Durham and London, Duke University Press 2016, opening 
epigraph of book: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Gramscis-Common-Sense-Inequality-
Narratives/dp/0822362198/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= 
29 This, of course, tallies with Gramsci’s description of “common sense” emerging from the 
lived experience of subaltern groups, even though Gramsci does not restrict “common sense” 
to them in isolation. 
30 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx-Engels Archive: 
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without simultaneously possessing the knowledge of the science 
and technology which underpins that labour. For their part, those 
technicians and engineers, the professional philosophers and social 
scientists who develop their knowledge in a condition of 
abstraction, separated irrevocably from the forces and powers 
which engage with economic reproduction on a day-to-day basis – 
often form conceptions of the world which are isolated from the 
social realities on the ground. 
Gramsci famously talks about the “subaltern” which is a some-
what disputed concept. I think he means by this, fundamentally, the 
proletariat (he is after all a Marxist) but also all the other exploited 
layers or oppressed groups which the proletariat must attract to its 
banner if it is to successfully challenge for power and achieve its 
own hegemony. In a lucid and persuasive piece, David Arnold 
argues that the term “subaltern” can be regarded a “convenient 
shorthand for a variety of subordinate classes – industrial workers, 
peasants, labourers, artisans, shepherds and so forth”.31 
These groups are, in the main,32 also the direct producers; i.e. 
those who produce the material means by which society is able to 
sustain. And so it is in keeping with the Gramscian notion of 
“common sense” that the “common sense” which issues out of the 
subaltern groups is in some way bound up with the way in which 
they labour and the direct, practical character of that labour as 
something which, ultimately, produces and reproduces the means 
of social existence. One may be doing some form of unskilled, 
manual labour, may not have a degree in philosophy or engineering, 
but one learns very quickly – intuitively and on the ground – what 
to do in order to avoid an electrical shock from a faulty piece of 
machinery; one may not have trained as a doctor, but one soon 
develops the first hand practical knowledge of the best thing to do 
when a fellow worker suffers a burn. 
 
31 David Arnold (1984) Gramsci and peasant subalternity in India, “The Journal of Peasant Studies”, 
11(4), 155-177, DOI: 10.1080/03066158408438246 
32 This division of labour between the manual and the mental does not exhaust Gramsci’s 
conception of the split between the direct members of a class and its intellectuals, for he does 
introduce mediating and mixed categories like that of “the technicians” who are “closely 
bound” to the group of entrepreneurs through the role that is “organic” to capital which they 
play (QdC, Q4§49, p. 475; in English Prison Notebooks Vol. 2 (hereafter PN), ed. and trans. J. A. 
Buttigieg, New York, Columbia University Press 1996, pp. 199 et seq.; second draft text in 
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The direct producers in their encounter with production and 
their experiences as a “subaltern” style underclass often develop 
this kind of practical knowledge – and this can provide the frame-
work for a broader form of thinking; an intuitive sense of savvy, a 
wry conception of the world and how it functions at the level of its 
fundamental mechanics. Those who are locked in the ivory towers 
of higher education and are abstracted from the life and the swell of 
the masses often lack any real awareness of the grinding processes 
by which the engine of society turns over – they lack the ability to 
achieve simple, practical tasks like changing a lightbulb or a tyre – 
and their world view is inherently idealistic for the same reason; 
they have not had to go through the experiences and tribulations of 
ordinary people which might help ground and sober them.  
What is more common sensical, for instance, than the notion of 
someone addressing their lack of formal education by saying they 
have passed through ‘the university of life’? It expresses in an 
immediate and intuitive form something fundamental about the 
division of labour, the antithesis which Marx describes between 
“mental and physical labor” – and thus it contains a powerful and 
radical truth about the underlying political and social contradictions 
which are latent in our society. At the same time, that same phrase 
also contains a germ of the reactionary – it can incite workers to 
disregard the intellectual sphere in a self-satisfied way; it occludes 
the understanding that the working class must win its way through 
to an intellectual awareness of the revolutionary nature of its own 
historical process – and that this has to be done in dialogue with 
the most able leaders and intellectuals – the “organic intellectuals”, 
in Gramsci’s own words. Indeed the way common sense 
conceptions of the world can be fetishized becomes the object of 
Gramsci’s criticism of Henri de Man, whom, Gramsci argues, 
“empirically […] counterposes to Marxism” “common sense”, 
“falling into the position of somebody who, after discovering 
folklore, witchcraft, etc., are tenaciously entwined in the psychology 
of specific popular strata, believed that he had ‘transcended’ 
modern science”.33  
And yet, while Gramsci acknowledges that it is important not to 
absolutize the ‘spontaneous’ conceptions of the world which arise 
from the masses at the expense of any systematic philosophy of 
 
33 QdC, Q3§48, p. 328; in English SPN, cit., p.197, and alternatively PN Vol. 2, cit., p. 49. 





praxis – Gramsci also acknowledges that “every ‘spontaneous’ 
movement contains rudimentary elements of conscious leadership, 
of discipline”34 and that these must be cultivated in the process by 
which a more systematic and totalizing conception can be formed 
as a pre-requisite for collective political action – i.e. the basis on 
which a class becomes “for itself”.35 
It seems that we encounter this kind of thing repeatedly with 
common sense statements, just as Gramsci points out – that they 
contain within themselves a duality – elements of the radical and 
the reactionary at work within the same proposition. But why is this 
the case? I think, in line with the tradition of the Roman Stoics 
onward, that common sense does indeed arise in the life forces of 
the population but at the same time it cannot reflect clearly and 
coherently a revolutionary perspective. Workers can develop 
common sense understandings and conceptions of the world, in the 
last analysis, through their encounter with production and the 
problems that arise from the practical issues which develop in the 
context of productive and direct labour. 
So, for example, builders building a house might become well 
versed through practical experience in all the ways to avoid getting 
injured (especially if the business they work for isn’t unionized), or 
they might become adept at using the minimal materials in the most 
efficient way so they might leave the job an hour early. Or a house-
holder who has never had a formal education in business or maths, 
but becomes skilled at rationalizing numbers and anticipating 
financial outcomes precisely because s/he has had to hone her/his 
experience and manage the finances in such a way that s/he can 
continue to put food on the table. It is this ability ‘to think on one’s 
feet’ which develops out of the encounter with immediate practical 
realities, which is then used to form broader ‘philosophical’ con-
ceptions and generalizations about the world at large. 
But what is vital to recognize is that such conceptions arise from 
the awareness which is cultivated in and through the achievement 
of practical tasks which have, generally speaking, isolated and 
individualized ends. The householder learns to balance the books in 
the interests of themselves and their individual family unit; the 
builder endeavours to work more efficiently or frugally in order to 
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get off a little earlier, to create a bit more free time outside work. 
Common sense forms of thinking then arise in the life of the 
masses as a whole – they grow out of proletarian, petite bourgeois 
and domestic labour more generally – but they grow out of the way 
in which this particular labourer or worker or householder is 
compelled to engage with the practical necessities of the objective 
world from the purview of his or her individual aims in isolation. 
So from the start, common sense thinking is marked by two 
essential characteristics: one, it is immediate, intuitive and pre-
rational – it emerges organically and semi-consciously from the 
awareness of strategies one uses to deal with practical necessities; 
two, it is a form of thinking which can often work within the 
framework of the isolated ends of a pure individuality – even if it 
arises from the productive life of the masses more broadly. 
Because common sense is a form of thought which nearly always 
operates on a purely individualistic basis, here is where its 
reactionary potentials inhere. Consider the example we have cited 
several times already. The case of the commonsensical housewife 
shrewdly and frugally managing the household finances. In the 
1980s Thatcher used this image as a metaphor for the economy 
more broadly as part and parcel of justifying her neoliberal pro-
gramme. In the 2010s, the Conservative coalition government drew 
upon something similar to support their own brand of austerity 
economics. The argument went as follows: the essentials of the 
national economic policy were simple – just like any ordinary 
household you had incomings and outgoings; the thing to do was 
make sure that you didn’t borrow money outside your means.  
In reality, however, any national economy is a considerably more 
complex and paradoxical affair. If a single household decides to cut 
back on its spending by 15%, such a reduction won’t affect the ex-
ternal incomes of any of the household members. If a government 
cuts the national budget by the same amount, employment and/or 
wages fall in the public sector, which means that those self-same 
people – nurses, police, teachers – end up spending less in the 
economy more generally, thereby harming businesses which are not 
directly under the auspices of government investment. The so- 
called ‘multiplier’ effect means, all things being equal, such cuts can, 
ultimately, result in the type of reduction in Gross Domestic Pro-
duct which comes from a decrease in demand, and therefore the 





government itself finds the overall pool of taxable income very much 
reduced. Cutting down household spending, won’t reduce the wages 
of those employed outside the house; but by “cutting its spending 
the government also ends up reducing its own income”.36 Or to say 
the same, a reduction of spending on the household level can have 
precisely the opposite effect of a reduction of spending on the level 
of the economy as a whole. This is because of the way in which the 
broader categories of the state, state workers, the private sector and 
consumers more broadly are fused in social and symbiotic relation-
ships of investment, consumption, waged-labour and taxation. 
Applying the metaphor of a householder managing domestic 
finances to the national economy as a whole, therefore, allows the 
complex and contradictory network of social and class relationships 
which underwrite the economy to be reimagined as a zero sum 
paradigm of a generic amount of money coming in and money 
going out. This, in turn, in turn, allows the state to rationalize 
measures of austerity – slashing to the state expenditure and social 
welfare – as coming under the rubric of the good commonsensical 
need to be careful with one’s finances in the most simple and 
practical of fashions. In the 2008 case, what was, in fact, an act of 
vast social redistribution from the bottom upwards – i.e. the 
slashing of social welfare and harder taxation policies against the 
poor majority in order to relieve the debt burden of high-finance – 
becomes transfigured into a purely individual tale of a government, 
having fallen on hard times, trying to be that bit more careful with 
the purse strings and needing to balance the books.  
When the economic issue is understood according to common 
sense thinking it takes on a generic and individualized aspect which 
obliterates the social and class contradictions it evolves out of. This 
provides a very powerful aid in rationalizing the predatory 
economic policy on the part of a ruling class. For not only is the 
aspect of class exploitation occluded by the sense that this is a 
simple, practical measure which is working in terms of a society 
(reconfigured as an individual) with a single and unified set of 
interests – but also the elite politicians and spin doctors who have 
to ‘sell’ the policy can do so by claiming that the thinking behind it 
 
36 Frank Van Lerven, Andrew Jackson, ‘A Government is not a Household’, New Economics 
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is operating according to the undeniable dictates of a simple and 
practical common sense which members of the broader population 
employ every day of their lives. In this way, the ruling class 
endeavours to fuse its immediate political and economic goals with 
the life of the populace, more generally hegemonizing them in 
alignment with its own particular ends.  
It is worth noting how often the ruling class mobilizes attitudes 
of common sense in its favour in these ways. After the 2008 
economic crisis which was caused by the unbridled casino 
capitalism of the elite sections of high finance, wealth-ridden 
investment banker Nigel Farage helped to shift focus from the 
wheeling and dealing of his stock market friends in and through a 
xenophobic narrative which sought to demonize the poorest 
immigrants, to see in them the source of the lack of housing, an 
underfunded and oversubscribed NHS, and the lack of decently 
paid jobs. The antipathy toward the immigrants inevitably had a 
strong racist tenor, mainly directed against East Europeans and 
Muslims, but what was interesting about such reactionary political 
interventions is that they were also justified according to the 
language of common sense. 
One of the reasons for this is because common sense thinking 
allowed the immigration question to be located as a purely practical 
issue, another zero-sum paradigm, which would allow the odious 
Farage to disavow some of the more noxious and toxically racist 
sensibilities of his UKIP/Brexit/Reform UK parties where and 
when necessary. The country could be described in purely 
quantitative terms, as having only so much space, and only so many 
jobs; the question of limiting the people who were flowing in, 
therefore, could be posed as a purely logistical one rather than one 
which carried particular ethical or racial implications. 
Once more, posing a complex social issue in a purely 
commonsensical fashion – i.e. i.e. conceptions of the world which 
arise in a spontaneous, immediate and semi-intuitive way – often 
means treating it in a purely individualized aspect which essentially 
obliterates the string of social factors at work behind the scenes. 
The amount of resources a society has to draw upon is never simply 
a static and unmoving quantity; in fact if a public health service is 
under strain it is often because the government is encouraging 
developments in the private sector health industry, if there is not 





sufficient housing available, it is often because wealthy landlords are 
allowing numbers of properties to sit fallow, and if poor immi-
grants are working for pittance amounts it is often because the go-
vernment has failed to introduce a decent minimum wage. And in 
reality, despite all the spiel about poorer immigrants draining jobs 
and resources in and through their increasing numbers, the effects 
that mass immigration actually has on a nation are nearly always 
contrary to common sense thinking. Indeed the immigrants from 
the 10 poorer countries, such as Poland, Estonia and Hungary who 
had joined the EU in 2004, and who had migrated to Britain in the 
ten years which followed – actually contributed significantly more 
to the UK economy than they had taken out in benefits. Five billion 
pounds more to be exact.37 
But in condensing all these complex political issues down, and 
projecting them onto a zero-sum paradigm of a set amount of 
resources vs a set amount of people – not only do we shift the 
political focus from the social elements at the top to those at the 
bottom, not only do we alleviate the parasitical role of high finance 
in terms of setting the basis for the financial crash, but we also 
manage to smuggle in what is a racist discourse demonizing the 
most vulnerable in and through the dispassionate and pragmatic 
mobilization of something called common sense; as Nigel Farage 
has it: “Getting immigration right isn't racist, it is common sense!”38 
In and through the prism of common sense conceptions of the 
world can become transformed from an organic whole in which 
various social and class interests are at work from behind the 
scenes, locked into conflicting relationships of antagonism and 
exploitation – to a purely individualized entity with a single and 
shared set of interests which can be quantified and adjudicated in 
an immediate and pragmatic fashion. In other words, issues which 
are a consequence of social and class exploitation become recon-
figured as purely logistical concerns on the part of a society which 
is now conceived as a purely uniform entity. 
 
37 Editorial, What have the immigrants ever done for us?, “The Economist” 8 November 2014: 
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To return to Gramsci then. I agree with his analysis of common-
sense as something which often inherits elements of ‘philosophy’ 
from previous epochs and absorbs their precepts into its own body 
of thought on an organic and unconscious basis. I also agree with 
his analysis of common sense as a form of thinking which is 
nurtured in the womb of the collective so to speak, which arises on 
the part of the population in the broadest sense of the word. But I 
part ways with him when he argues that ‘every social stratum has its 
own common sense’. I think it is more accurate to say that 
common sense often develops within the direct producers and 
those who facilitate the reproduction of domestic life – but that the 
ruling class appropriates common sense modes of thinking which 
arise from the subaltern classes in order to mobilize them in terms 
of its own interests. I think one might argue that when it comes to 
“common sense” conceptions the ruling class achieves what might 
be called in Gramsci-speak a type of “passive revolution”, that is to 
say it instrumentalizes such conceptions ‘from above’ in order to 
preserve its own hegemony. And while I think Gramsci is correct to 
say that common sense thinking is pre-rational, and that it 
possesses both reactionary and revolutionary aspects, he does not 
go to the heart of the matter here; he does not sufficiently explain 
how and why common sense conceptions of the world carry both 
the revolutionary and reactionary moment. It is correct to argue 
that the radical aspect comes from the fact that common sense 
conceptions of the world often arise through the practical life of 
those tied most directly to the means of production and its 
corollary in the domestic sphere. However, Gramsci doesn’t 
recognize that the reactionary aspect comes from the fact that such 
conceptions often tend to express the lives of those same social 
layers in a purely individualized fashion: a method of thinking 
which, when applied to broader political problems, more often than 
not neutralizes their social roots – the forms of social and class 
exploitation which set the basis of them – in favour of a purely 
individual and pragmatic paradigm. 
Because of this I am, I must confess, far more pessimistic than 
Gramsci when it comes to the possibility of achieving what he 
hopes to do; that is, to convert “common sense” into “good sense” 
– to actualize the radical components of common sense thinking, 
drawing them into a self-conscious and rational revolutionary 





schema. Perhaps it is because, in my own time, people like Nigel 
Farage – but also the ruling class consensus more broadly – have 
managed to mobilize common sense conceptions so successfully 
and so adroitly in their own favour. Common sense plays a part in 
what is one of the most fundamental constructions of ruling class 
hegemony and it works in tandem with another fundamentally 
important concept, that of ‘political correctness’. Political 
correctness involves the essentially Nietzschean inversion that 
those who are most oppressed, most exploited, are actually those 
who have managed to sneakily accrue real political influence and 
power from behind the scenes. A sense of ‘political correctness’ is 
precisely what allows them to achieve this; so, for example, a 
common narrative runs as follows – more and more immigrants are 
given access to houses and jobs39 at the expense of ‘indigenous’ 
workers because a ‘liberal elite’ is working to create a political 
climate in which this is commonplace in and through the creation 
of ‘politically correct’ laws and forms of behaviour. ‘Political 
correctness’ here works as an antipode to ‘common sense’. The 
‘liberal elite’ want open borders, they want to allow as many 
immigrants in as possible simply because they have the luxury of 
righteousness; their elite jobs won’t be affected and if the public 
health system is overwhelmed by foreigners – they themselves can 
rely on private means. The person on the ground, however – the 
ordinary Joe going about his or her daily life – understands (so the 
argument goes) that the influx of immigrants provides an existential 
threat to their economic and cultural existence – and they 
understand this from a clear, common sense point of view which 
does not require any rational interrogation of the deeper political 
and social forces at work in society at large. They understand it pre-
rationally as a given fact which grows from the nature of their 
immediate and direct ‘experience’ – and thus it doesn’t matter what 
the boffins or the intellectuals or all those people who are divorced 
from ‘the real world’ actually think, precisely because the 
understanding of such people is, by virtue of their social position, 
bereft of plain, ordinary common sense. 
 
39 Mail on Line Reporter, Half of new homes built in Britain the next five years will go to migrants, “The 
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So here we see how common sense becomes a vital component 
in helping to construct a Nietzschean vision of the world in which 
the most vulnerable and the most exploited – immigrants working 
for low wages often doing jobs nobody else wants to do – are 
transfigured into a sinister social power which is gradually relieving 
the ‘ordinary’ (read white) people who are in some way ‘indigenous’ 
to the country of their economic and cultural benefits. Further-
more, they, the immigrants, are able to achieve this because there is 
a complicit layer – the liberal intelligentsia – who are all the time 
working to help cultivate “immigrants’ rights” because their elitism 
disqualifies them from the ordinary experiences of the everyday 
reality and allows them to think in purely politically correct terms. 
And how do we become aware of such a social situation? Well, we 
have access to it through using the good common-sensical thinking 
which arises from the direct and immediate nature of individual 
experience. For this reason, such thinking cannot be refuted by 
appeals to statistics or scientifically orientated facts about what, 
precisely, immigrants earn, the levels of public housing they actually 
have access to, or the number of their representatives who actually 
manage to hold positions in the corridors of power. 
These things don’t matter because this type of common sense 
thinking is explicitly irrational – that is, it fetishes the intuitive 
immediacy of ‘direct experience’ over and against the more 
laborious and rational endeavour to discover and describe the 
fundamental social and political agencies which are at work behind 
the scenes. The common sense narrative ‘cannot’ be refuted by 
rational argument precisely because it has not been evoked by 
rational argument. Anybody who has ever tried to counter these 
kind of anti-immigrant views with statistical examples of why they 
don’t hold has almost certainly had the experience of this; the 
rationality and logic of your arguments can be sarcastically 
dismissed by the fact that to ‘intellectualize’ such issues is to remain 
indifferent or unaware of the actual ‘ordinary’ people on the ground 
who feel the deleterious effects of mass-immigration in the marrow 
of their bones and on a day-to-day basis. 
Of course, the Nietzschean-style conclusions which are bolstered 
by this type of thinking do not truly mediate the interests of 
ordinary people but rather are advertized and promoted most 
vividly by the ruling classes, appearing in all the most rabidly right-





wing papers which are invariably owned by multi-millionaire press 
barons. Papers which constantly mobilize notions of common 
sense against a ‘nannying welfare state’ – a welfare state which, for 
example, wants to provide workers with protections for ‘health and 
safety’ without realizing that this is to spend a lot of money on 
nothing, because anyone who is involved in a trade has the simple 
common-sense to ‘think on their feet’ and doesn’t need to be 
smothered in the type of bureaucratic red-tape and ridiculous rules 
which will hinder them from better doing their job.40 In practice, of 
course, such a common sense view inevitably helps the position of 
bosses who then have to spend less kitting their workers out safely. 
Or the ‘ridiculously’ politically correct laws which liberal 
politicians are ‘compelled’ into enacting by ‘militant feminists’, laws 
which police gender relationships in the work place so that it is no 
longer possible for people to initiate romantic relationships based 
on a general common-sensical understanding of physical 
boundaries, and instead men become absolutely terrified of being 
sued by a female colleague just for the fact of having looked at her 
the wrong way. In practice, of course, militating against the nearly 
always inadequate laws which address sexual harassment in the 
work place provides a means to inscribe the power of wealthy, 
typically male bosses against their junior and less powerful 
underlings, while also pressing against those movements which are 
trying to provide victims with voices such as Metoo.41  
In these times, therefore, common sense has been deployed 
incredibly effectively by the ruling class as a strategy to attack 
workers’ rights, the emancipation of women, the legal protections 
of migrants, , the status of Muslims and minorities more generally, 
whilst furiously defending the interests of financial elites and the 
most privileged sectors of society – in that same moment common 
sense conceptions of the world allow such claims to be presented in 
terms of the ‘everyman or woman’ and his or her practical struggle 
by way of an ordinary existence which is increasingly stifled and 
menaced by a liberal elite and the forces of political correctness. 
 
40 Richard O’Hagan, Common sense would cost a lot less than ‘health and safety’ rules, “The Daily Mail” 
26 August 2009: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1209162/Common-sense-cost-
lot-farcical-health-safety-rules.html. 
41 Jathan Janove, J.D, During #MeToo Movement, Replace Avoidance with Common Sense, “The 
Society for Human Resource Management” 6 May 2019: https://www.shrm.org/about-
shrm/Pages/default.aspx. 





Common sense and Political Correctness here provide the 
antipodes, antithetical concepts which work to structure a vision of 
the world which operates according to a Nietzschean-like inversion 
whereby the interests of the powerful are presented as those of the 
powerless, and the rights of the powerless are to be crushed in the 
name of individual freedom and the struggle against elites.  
For this reason, I cannot concur with Gramsci’s strategy of 
trying to mobilize conceptions on the part of the working class and 
its satellites – because, in our day and age, trying to tease out the 
radical elements in common sense thinking (which no doubt exist) 
is conceding too much; helping to equip people with a train of 
thought and a way of thinking which neatly dovetails with the 
emotive, irrational and individualistic means by which the powerful 
are able to prosecute their interests in and through a plebeian motif, 
an aura of ordinariness. But it is about more than this. The harness-
ing of common sense conceptions for social transformation prob-
ably reached its pinnacle with Tom Paine’s pamphlet and the way in 
which its sentiments were able to help fuse a broader mass move-
ment for American independence. But one should also note that 
the American Revolution of 1775-83 was probably the least radical 
and thorough-going of any of the great modern revolutions. In 
essence it was a political revolution, that is to say, in the words of 
the late, great Marxist historian Neil Davidson, it was a struggle 
“for control of the state, involving factions of the existing ruling 
class, which leave fundamental social and economic structures 
intact”.42 
It was not an event which touched the socio-economic structures 
of society and resulted in a fundamental transformation of them – 
as the later American Civil War would do in abolishing the slave 
mode of production in the American South. The essential social 
forms remained unmolested and intact – what happened was that a 
very visible foreign power which had become increasingly parasite-
ical in terms of its tax demands was jettisoned from its political and 
economic control of the thirteen colonies. The modes of exploit-
ation which the British employed against the colonists were naked 
and visible for the eye to see, the lack of political rights which the 
colonists had and the debt burdens they were accruing were as clear 
 
42 Neil Davidson, How Revolutionary were the Bourgeois Revolutions?, Chicago, Haymarket Books 
2012, p. 494. 





as day, and thus the change (the revolution) the bourgeoisie wanted 
to affect could be presented according to the clear immediacies of 
common sense and its capacity to pose social problems in a highly 
individual and isolated manner; i.e. in terms of the oppression of a 
youthful ‘nation’ by an ancient and tyrannical monarchy. 
But once we come to the issue of proletarian emancipation in 
our own time, we discover that the ends of the revolution cannot 
be convincingly articulated in a common-sense fashion. That is 
partly to do with the fact that the proletarian revolution is a ‘social 
revolution’ in the most profound sense; it involves a transformation 
of society which goes to the very roots, and such a ‘social 
revolution’43 can only be conceived of by a rational understanding 
of the underlying social relationships which it seeks to transform at 
the most essential level. In the case of the proletarian revolution 
this involves the way in which the class of capitalists are able to 
appropriate some portion of proletarian labour in terms of profit 
and set into motion capital reproduction. 
But the ability of proletarian labour to yield this ‘surplus value’ to 
be appropriated by the bourgeoisie is premised on the fact that the 
commodity ‘labour power’ is able to attain a value over and above 
the socially necessary labour-time required to bring it to market and 
which determines its market value therein. In other words, the 
value of labour power is both equal to itself, in terms of producing 
the value which is necessary for its own continued reproduction – 
and is greater than itself in terms of being able to self-generate a 
value over and above its price as a commodity which can be 
absorbed as profit. This is a profoundly dialectical contradiction – 
on it the whole edifice of revolutionary Marxism rests; i.e. the 
practical necessity for the proletariat to take control of the means of 
production on a democratic and collective basis can only be 
adduced from a precise theoretical and philosophical awareness of 
how the bourgeoisie is able to appropriate a portion of surplus 
labour from the proletariat, how capital itself is labour power in a 
veiled and alienated guise; and how – as the estranged product of 
an excess of proletarian labour – capital can and must be brought 
under the auspices of proletarian power in and through a 
revolutionary unfolding. 
 
43 Actually on reflection, this is not the case for the majority of social revolutions in history, 
but truly and profoundly does apply to the proletarian revolution. 





But common-sense understanding in its immediacy and irration-
ality can never penetrate the true secret of the labour power-capital 
relationship because such a relationship can only appear to the 
purview of common sense in a reified guise, i. e. it appears in a 
purely individual guise by which a particular company or capitalist 
agrees on a purely subjective basis to pay a particular type of worker 
a particular wage. The common sense point-of-view might , on 
occasion, encourage the worker to clamour for a higher wage, in 
order to better serve the needs of his or her individual family unit 
which have arisen in the context of their particular and practical 
existence – but precisely because of its immediate and individual-
istic tenor common sense understanding can never pierce the 
nature of labour as a general and abstract social phenomenon which 
manifests in the guise of labour power; it can never, therefore, bring 
to light the process by which a portion of labour power is extracted 
by the bourgeoisie, and consequently, it can never apprehend the 
revolutionary necessity which inheres in the proletariat by virtue of 
its social-historic position vis-à-vis the processes of production. 
One is tempted to call to mind Lenin’s conception of ‘trade union 
consciousness’ in which workers feel the necessity to ‘combine in 
unions’ in order to seek the type of “labour legislation”44 which 
would lead to better wages and working conditions but which 
leaves the capital – waged-labour relationship in its fundamental 
form untouched. Is Lenin’s conception of “trade union conscious-
ness” an example of a Gramscian common sense conception of the 
world? Arguably, yes, in as much as, for Lenin, “trade union con-
sciousness” is part of the “spontaneous awakening”45 of working 
class consciousness in its earliest, immediate and unsystematic 
form; while for Gramsci too common sense conceptions of the 
world are also an expression of the “‘spontaneous’ feelings of the 
masses … ‘Spontaneous’ in the sense that they are not the result of 
any systematic educational activity on the part of an already 
conscious leading group, but have been formed through everyday 
experience illuminated by ‘common sense’”.46 
 
44 V. I Lenin, What Is To Be Done? “The Spontaneity of the Masses and the Consciousness of 
the Social-Democrats”, Marxist Internet Archive: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/ii.htm 
45 Ibid. 
46 QdC, Q3§48 p. 331; in English SPN, cit., pp.198-9 and alternatively PN Vol. 2, cit., p. 51. 





In other words, even the most radical form of common sense 
conception applied to the fundamental question of class exploit-
ation in our present day only leads to reformist conclusions; it can 
never point beyond them toward a fundamentally revolutionary 
transformation, and is unable, therefore, to touch on the possibility 
of an authentic and society-wide emancipation. And because 
common sense cannot by its very nature apprehend the underlying 
relation of exploitation which structures the capitalist social world, 
it cannot adequately comprehend many of the peripheral issues 
which arise from the social contradiction which opens up between 
capital and labour power; rather it can only interpret economic 
crises, housing shortages, political strategies of austerity and so on, 
on the basis of an immediate and pragmatic irrationalism which 
most fundamentally poses these issues in abstract and profoundly 
individualized terms. 
I don’t say that this can never have any radical benefits; it is good 
common sense, for example, to say that rich people with ten houses 
might give some of those up at a time when there is a housing 
crisis; but more generally speaking the ‘logic’ of common sense 
most regularly works to obscure the network of social relationships 
which is concealed beneath the surface of social reality, instead 
personalizing and individualizing them in terms of a rather robust 
and pragmatic form of moralism. In our own day, I think that the 
narrowing capacity of more progressive social agencies to translate 
“common sense” into “good sense” in the characteristic Gramscian 
mode is expressed not only by the fact that the ruling class have so 
effectively hitched common sense to their own ideological project – 
but, relatedly, even though Gramsci identified correctly the pre-
rational essence of common sense and its component of 
spontaneity, he did not sufficiently draw attention to the fact of its 
individualized and isolated character and the inability it has to 
conceive of the most fundamental problems we are faced by as 
being social phenomena which require social solutions – something 
which is particularly important when one is dealing with a capitalist 
set of social relations which inevitably assume a profoundly reified 
appearance. 
